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#### The central question of this debate is whose politics best creates a radical break with capitalism—the 1AC’s focus on the particular identity marker of Islam reduces capitalism to just one of a set of antagonisms and causes endless subdivision of political demands which dangerously distracts from revolutionary politics proper—this round is a question of starting points—the perm can never be truly radical because the 1AC’s particular focus has always already ceded the universal

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If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

#### The aff is wasted energy – fighting particular battles without changing the way the economy works means nothing really changes – the aff just obscures the logic of capitalism

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

The big news of today’s post-political age of the ‘end of ideology’ is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom, the subordinated of the process of production to social control – the radical repoliticization of the economy. That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities…), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple ad hoc coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what really matters – will *not* be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized. 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### Founding politics in the identity marker of Islam guarantees co-option. Islamic movements are not monolithically anti-capitalist and have already been appropriated and commodified by capitalism. In practice, the 1AC’s affirmation of Islamic law culminates in nothing more than hollow consumerism under late modernity

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There is a seeming tension between professed Islamic virtues and the logic of consumer capitalism. While the former is often defined as modesty, thrift, other-worldly devotion, spiritualism, and communitarianism, the latter is perceived to cultivate self-indulgence, conspicuous consumption, this-worldly orientation, materialism, and individualism. Islamic puritanists see capitalism as inherently incompatible with Islam and instead advocate "Islamic economics" (e.g. Maududi 1975) as an alternative system with its own set of rules, values, and practices, or as a "third way" between capitalism and socialism (Pfeifer 2001; Uddin 2003). Aversion to consumerism has generally been strong among Islamic thinkers and politicians, even among those who seek to combine Islamic ethics and capitalism.3 For example, those Islamists who take a "moral capitalist" stand (Tuğal 2002, 93) emphasize religious ethics and solidarity in the everyday life of Muslim subjects, advocate moderation in consumption, and urge the avoidance of extravagance and waste (Kuran 2004). In this issue, Reina Lewis and Carla Jones show that producers of Muslim [End Page 4] women's magazines face the problem of formulating and putting into practice an Islam-oriented ethics while remaining profitable and competitive in a capitalist economy. In Gökariksel and Secor's analysis, women consumers of tesettür-fashion engage in daily mediations in an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideals with their multiple other sociospatial and cultural concerns and desires. Their everyday decisions about what to wear thereby involve navigating a complicated ethical terrain.

Even as Islamic movements present themselves in opposition to commodity cultures that spread Western lifestyles and values (or to Western lifestyles and values that spread commodity cultures), commodification is "a context and activity historically shared by Islamists and secularists alike, rather than being a domain that divided them" (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 225). For those who identify themselves as Islamists—wearing certain kinds of clothes, eating particular foods, shopping in special stores, starting Islamic businesses—consumption becomes a crucial means to fashion an identity. More broadly, Muslim identities, like secular ones, are expressed through commodities (Abaza 2001; Sandıkcı and Ger 2001; Salamandra 2004; Gökariksel 2007). While some conceptualize Islam and consumer capitalism as antithetical or as involving a one-way relationship in which capitalism transforms Islam, we approach their relationship as one that is more complex and multidirectional.4 The articles in this issue examine how the different actors in the Islamic culture industry and consumer market mediate between these conflicting values of Islamic capitalism.

#### Vote neg on ethics - resisting this reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility

**Zizek and Daly** 20**04**

(Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### This is not a meaningless question – the structures of capitalism are driving multiple large-scale processes that are increasingly out of the control of individuals living their lives. Global warming, multiple wars of accumulation, loss of land and income stratification: all of these are making life unlivable.

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 145-147)

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.

For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.

In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

#### The aff addresses a pretext for intervention but not the root cause. Islamaphobia is driven by economic motives

Squires, ’13 [Jessica Squires, August 27, 2013, Socialist.ca, Socialism and Islam, <http://www.socialist.ca/node/1882>, jj]

It’s been a dozen years since the “war on terror” and two years since the start of the Arab Spring—including the latest phase of the Egyptian Revolution that toppled President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Western pundits have often reduced these developments to a “clash of civilizations,” of secular freedom versus Muslim dictatorship. Canadian generals call the people of Afghanistan “scumbags,” while Prime Minister Stephen Harper claims that “the major threat is still Islamicism.” How do we explain Islamist organizations and how can we best show solidarity with those resisting Western imperialism? Imperialism and Islamophobia The idea that Islam is dangerous is simply Islamophobia, which exists in order to divide people in the struggle, and to justify colonial oppression and war. The backdrop is the decline of US power in relation to other world powers, and its continuing struggle to remain on top economically and militarily. Like other religions, Islam is incredibly diverse. It has a rich history and can even be seen to have parallels to some developments in Christianity. This is important because one of the most common strategies used to denounce Muslim groups and movements is to paint them as a rigid monolith, with no sense of history, uniqueness, or context. During the first phase of the “war on terror,” Islamophobia was used to justify the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq—claiming Islam is a monolithic and reactionary religion that led to 9/11, and that Muslim women are incapable of fighting for their own rights. This ignored the rich diversity of Islam, obfuscated the role of the US in funding Osama bin Laden and in arming Saudi Arabia, and denied women’s self-emancipation in Muslim countries and in the West. In the second phase of the wars, Islamophobic ideas were used to justify the continuing occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. In this phase, Western elites spread the notion, again, that all Islam is the same, and thereby justified fighting against resistance movements in the occupied countries because of their Islamic content. Now, new contradictions have emerged in government reactions to the recent wave of uprisings that began with Arab countries and the Middle East. In reaction to the Arab Spring, Western governments paid lip service to revolution while trying to hijack it—from “humanitarian intervention” in Libya, to using the Muslim Brotherhood to enforce neoliberalism in Egypt.

#### The criticism turns case: capitalism obliterates Muslim self-determination by making spirituality and cultural freedom subservient to profit and commodification

Edwin, 13 (Shirin Edwin, Sam Houston State University, Department of Foreign Languages, 77341-2147, Huntsville, TX, USAWomen's Studies International Forum, Volume 37, March–April 2013, “Underlining religious sidelining: Islamic Feminism and Marxism in Mohammed Umar's Amina” Pages 64–72 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2013.01.011>, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277539513000149>, jj)

Theories at play: Islam, Marxism, Capitalism and Islamic feminism

In his work on the recent impact of Islam in politics, literature and postcolonial Islam, Majid consistently draws attention to the role of religion in shaping peoples' lives as a repository of their memories and ideas. However, religion, particularly Islam, argues Majid, as social ideology, a political system or just spiritual practice, among other indigenous systems across the world, has suffered not because of a clash of civilizations as famously suggested by Samuel Huntington, but because of more tangible economic and political forces—capitalism and globalization (2004, p.9). The lack of importance attributed to religion, argues Majid, stems from the unabashed promotion of Western-style freedom and modernity, a shorthand for capitalism, “running roughshod on the world's traditions and cultures, dehumanizing rich and poor, making life untenable for the latter, and fueling violent reactions and the politics of terror,” exacerbating such socio-economic problems the world over as sub-human working conditions, under-remunerated occupations, human trafficking, the rise of childhood labor and exploitation (2007, p. 36). Majid is also quick to point out that this critique does not target and consequently dismiss Western-style culture or systems themselves. Rather, his skepticism exposes the contemporary model of world relations that is animated and controlled by capitalistic motives, where “everything converges into the production of “commodities,” and the sphere of the “economy” renders capitalism as the “central social signification” (2004, p. 13). The steady onslaught of capitalistic imperialism or globalization, avers Majid, has thus resulted in the balance in global relations as very much a one-sided affair, stifling other voices and narratives, and leading to the “the breakdown of traditional communities that are forcibly integrated into the global economic system.” (2000, p. 7).

#### We should organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

* Individualism warrant

**McLaren ‘06** (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>, jj)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

#### The alternative is not the liberal secularism the 1AC critiques. The alternative is necessary to create an authentic communist theology which is radically responsible to everyone. The 1AC is an externalization of ethics by making political responsibility subservient to a higher power—we must suspend belief in a big Other and divine will

Ruehl ’11 (Robert, Syracuse University, International Journal of Zizek Studies, “Žižek’s Communist Theology: A Revolutionary Challenge to America’s Capitalist God”, Volume 5 Number 1, <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/247/386>, jj)

God emptied himself into Christ. Jesus died on the cross. At that point, God fully died. The transcendent God no longer existed. Because of God’s total death, the desire for a big Other who can save us is not a viable option, but this death of God leaves us in a position of revolutionary responsibility. No divine other will save us; we must save ourselves and the world in which we live. Žižek takes the end of God to its final conclusion: we must live communally. This communal conclusion points to why capitalism must end as the logical conclusion of Žižek’s theology. The death of God leads to a communal way of living in the world; capitalism, however, is not communal. It depends on a regulated political system that sustains greed and excessive accumulation of property for some while the majority serve those who are getting wealthy. Capitalism has led to apocalyptic times. New forms of apartheid mean that we need people to unite in a way that communally addresses this injustice resulting from global capitalism. In this way, Žižek offers a communist theology in which global capitalism is not an option. What I am here calling Žižek’s communist theology is, therefore, a belief that there is no big Other that divinely orders the world. We are alone and radically responsible to each other. The conclusion is that we need to unite and help each other, and we need to act in ways that violently disrupt systems of oppression. We need to resist immediate action; we need to thoughtfully consider the systems of oppression and our actions, then we need to act so as to undermine any big Other that creates oppression and domination. Žižek’s communist theology, therefore, emphasizes community, justice, disruption, and meditative considerations of one’s context. The death of God, then, radically challenges America’s god, Capitalism.

#### Risk the impossible!

**Zizek and Daly ‘04**

(Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 18-19)

For Zizek, **a confrontation with the obscenities of abundance capitalism also requires a transformation of the ethico-political imagination. It is no longer a question of developing ethical guidelines within the existing political framework** (the various institutional and corporate ‘ethical committees’) **but of developing a politicization of ethics;** an ethics of the Real.8 **The starting point here is an insistence on the unconditional autonomy of the subject; of accepting that as** human beings **we** are **ultimately** responsible for our actions **and being-in-the-world up to** and **including** the **constructions of the** capitalist system itself. Far from simple norm-breaking or refining / reinforcing existing social protocol, **an ethics of the Real tends to emerge through** norm-breaking and in finding new directions that, by definition, involve **traumatic changes:** i.e. the Real in genuine ethical challenge. An ethics of the Real does not simply defer to the impossible **(or infinite Otherness) as an unsurpassable horizon that already marks every act as a failure, incomplete and so on.** Rather, such an ethics is one that fully accepts contingency but which is nonetheless prepared to risk the impossible in the sense of breaking out of standardized positions**.** We might say that it is an ethics which is not only politically motivated but which also draws its strength from the political itself. For Zizek an **ethics** of the Real (or Real ethics) **means that we cannot rely on any form of symbolic Other that would endorse our (in)decisions and (in)actions:** for example, the ‘neutral’ financial data of the stockmarkets; the expert knowledge of Beck’s ‘new modernity’ scientists, the economic and military councils of the New World Order; the various (formal and informal) tribunals of political correctness; or any of the mysterious laws of God, nature or the market. **What Zizek affirms is a radical culture of ethical identification** for the left **in which the alternative forms of militancy must first of all be militant** with themselves. That is to say, **they must be militant in the fundamental ethical sense of not relying on any external/higher authority and** in the development of a political imagination that**,** like Zizek’s own thought, **exhorts us to risk the impossible.**

### Case

#### New drone restrictions cause a shift to “boots on the ground” style interventions

Coughlin 2-7-’13, Con Coughlin is an expert on international terrorism and the Middle East; with the benefit of 25 years in foreign journalism, he deftly scrutinises world affairs. 07 Feb 2013, The Telegraph, Drones are gruesome, but would we prefer boots on the ground?, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9855577/Drones-are-gruesome-but-would-we-prefer-boots-on-the-ground.html>, jj

While the majority of drone patrols are reconnaissance missions, drones are also used to strike terrorist targets, with varying success. The Washington-based New America Foundation estimates that around 80 per cent of those killed by US drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan are militants, although human rights groups claim the percentage of civilian casualties is far higher. But at a time when Western governments are increasingly reluctant to commit combat troops, we are becoming ever more reliant on aerial robots to do the job for us. Rather than sending our young men and women to risk being killed or maimed by roadside bombs, it is easier to vaporise the enemy with a well-directed Hellfire missile.¶ The drones’ effectiveness could be severely limited if the human rights lobby achieves its goal of imposing so many legal restrictions on their use as to limit their ability to track and destroy a determined and resourceful enemy such as al-Qaeda.¶ For this reason I believe the Obama administration is right to fall back on the arguments advanced by the Blair government to justify the invasion of Iraq, namely that a country’s right to defend itself should include the ability to take pre-emptive military action. Al-Qaeda and its allies are waging a war against the West which knows no boundaries. If politicians on both sides of the Atlantic do not wish to send their soldiers to fight, then they should ensure the drones can do the job for them.

#### Turns case

Llenza ’11, Michael Steven Llenza, Diplomacy Department, Norwich University, Global Security Studies, Spring, 2011, Volume 2, Issue 2, Targeted Killings in Pakistan: A Defense, <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Targeted%20Killings.pdf>, jj

A More Humanitarian Option¶ Regardless of the possibility of civilian deaths, if the United States continues its policy of ¶ targeted killings, which by all signs it appears to, then the humanitarian benefits of drone strikes ¶ far outweigh their costs of the alternative. Predator strikes introduce greater discrimination in ¶ targeting than full-scale military assault or large-scale warfare would permit (Anderson, 2009, ¶ p.8). They allow the United States to seek out those who mean it harm without having to launch ¶ a full-scale invasion or placing U.S. forces at risk. Without placing U.S. and coalition forces at¶ risk, the government can go after the terrorist without the fear of a counterassault that might ¶ increase the use of force and cause more collateral damage (Anderson, 2009, pp.7-8). ¶ Although some may see military action on the ground more palatable than a standoff ¶ killing, invading a hostile area that is predominantly civilian would inevitably result in the death ¶ and injury of far more innocent people than those caused by targeted drone strikes. In addition, ¶ this measure is more commensurate with the conditions of self-defense, that those killed be ¶ responsible for the threat being posed (Statman). Furthermore, as a strategic option, drone ¶ strikes are a prudent alternative to what may otherwise result in a larger, costlier and undesirable ¶ conflict (Anderson, 2010, p.32).

#### Plan’s restriction of war powers causes outsourcing to proxies.

Wittes ’11, Benjamin Wittes is a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he is the Research Director in Public Law, and Co-Director of the Harvard Law School - Brookings Project on Law and Security. Detention and Denial [electronic resource] : The Case for Candor after Guantanamo. Washington : Brookings Institution Press, 2011., ebook, accessed via Wayne State online library, pg 28-29, jj

That is the equilibrium toward which we have drifted, and it ¶ should surprise nobody, for it is an entirely foreseeable consequence of the incentive structure that we have created. Imagine ¶ for a moment that you had described the direction of our legal ¶ policy choices to a devotee of the law and economics movement—¶ a field based on the central insight that legal rules create behavioral incentives. Imagine telling, say, Richard Posner that we ¶ would suddenly make detention difficult and refuse for years to ¶ create a stable regime of known, clear rules. Imagine also that you ¶ had then asked this platonic Posner to identify the consequences. ¶ He probably would have replied that detention would grow less ¶ visible. We would release some people precipitously. We would ¶ rely on proxies more. We probably would kill some people that ¶ we might have captured before. Rarely does life comport with ¶ theory as well as detention policy has conformed to the predictions that law and economics would suggest. As the real Richard ¶ Posner wrote of the original decision to judicialize Guantánamo ¶ proceedings, it “seems like a sensible, ‘practical’ decision, but may ¶ not be. . . . [T]he decision may just encourage the government to ¶ hold more detainees abroad, say, in Afghanistan or Iraq, . . . and ¶ what would be gained by that?”8¶ None of what has happened was hard to predict. Water finds a ¶ path to the sea. Dam a river and it will flow around the dam. This ¶ metaphor, something of a cliché in discussing campaign finance ¶ law and attempts to regulate money in politics, applies with equal ¶ force in counterterrorism operations. The reason is simple, and ¶ we ignore it at considerable risk of intellectual blindness: The call ¶ to prevent terrorist events is so compelling politically that just as ¶ gravity operates on water, it will operate on politicians and other ¶ officials responsible for security. It will operate so strongly that ¶ new restrictions in one area will merely shift government energies ¶ to other areas. Encumber the use of one power, and authorities ¶ will just use another; throw a wrench in that one, and they’ll ¶ move on to something else. If prosecutions in federal court are ¶ too hard, you create incentives to use military commissions. If the ¶ commissions are too generous to the accused, detention without ¶ trial will see greater use. Make it too tough to use a particular ¶ form of detention and the government will shift to others. Make ¶ detention broadly problematic and you promote the use of proxies less fastidious than we are and the use of drones.¶ The government interests at stake are so powerful that the ¶ executive will deploy every lawful option available and will show ¶ enormous creativity in expanding the field of options—both by ¶ making novel legal arguments and by developing tactical innovations. The attempt to force counterterrorism operations to ¶ take place through conventional means of law enforcement will ¶ impede it and channel it to some degree. For the most part, however, it will redirect it to less visible, less attractive, and more ¶ violent exercises of government power.

#### That’s net worse and more Islamaphobic

**Goldsmith 12** Jack, June 29 “Proxy Detention in Somalia, and the Detention-Drone Tradeoff” Jack Goldsmith is the Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches and writes about national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, international law, internet law, foreign relations law, and conflict of laws. Before coming to Harvard, Professor Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003. Professor Goldsmith is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/proxy-detention-in-somalia-and-the-detention-drone-tradeoff/>

There has been speculation about the effect of the Obama administration’s pinched detention policy – i.e. no new detainees brought to GTMO, and no new detainees to Parwan (Afghanistan) from outside Afghanistan – on its other counterterrorism policies. I have long believed **there must be some tradeoff between narrowing U.S. detention capabilities and other counterterrorism options,** at least implicitly, and not necessarily for the better. As I wrote three years ago, in response to news reports **that the Obama administration’s cutback on USG detentions resulted in more USG drone strikes and more outsourcing of rendition, detention, and interrogation**: There are at least **two problems** with this general approach to incapacitating terrorists. First, **it is not ideal for security**. Sometimes **it would be more useful for the United States to capture and interrogate a terrorist** (if possible) **than to kill him with a Predator drone. Often the United States could get better information if it, rather than another country, detained and interrogated a terrorist suspect. Detentions at Guantanamo are more secure than detentions in Bagram or in third countries. *The second problem is that terrorist suspects often end up in less favorable places***. Detainees in Bagram have fewer rights than prisoners at Guantanamo, and many in Middle East and South Asian prisons have fewer yet. Likewise, **most detainees would rather be in one of these detention facilities than be killed by a Predator drone**. **We congratulate ourselves when we raise legal standards for detainees, but in many respects all we are really doing is driving the terrorist incapacitation problem out of sight, to a place where terrorist suspects are treated worse.** The main response to this argument – especially as it applies to the detention-drone tradeoff – has been to deny any such tradeoff on the ground that there are no terrorists outside of Afghanistan (a) whom the United States is in a position to capture on the ground (as opposed to kill from the sky), and (b) whom the USG would like to detain and interrogate. Dan Klaidman’s book provides some counter-evidence, but I will save my analysis of that for a review I am writing. Here I would like to point to an important story by Eli Lake that reveals that the “United States soldiers have been hunting down al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia”; that U.S. military and CIA advisers work closely with the Puntland Security Force in Somalia, in part to redress piracy threats but mainly to redress threats from al-Shabab; that the Americans have since 2009 captured and brought to the Bosaso Central Prison sixteen people (unclear how many are pirates and how many are al-Shabab); and that American interrogators are involved in questioning al-Shabab suspects. The thrust of Lake’s story is that the conditions of detention at the Bosaso Central Prison are atrocious. But the story is also important for showing that that the United States is involved outside of Afghanistan in capturing members of terrorists organizations that threaten the United States, and does have a national security need to incapacitate and interrogate them. It does not follow, of course, that the USG can or should be in the business of detaining every al-Shabab suspect currently detained in the Bosaso Central Prison. But the Lake story does show that **the alternatives to U.S. detention are invariably worse from a human rights perspective**. It portends (along with last month’s WPR Report and related DOD press release) that **our creeping involvement on the ground in places like Somalia and Yemen mean that the USG will in fact be in a position to capture higher-level terrorists in al Qaeda affiliates**. And **that in turn suggests that the factual premise underlying the denial of a detention-drone tradeoff will become harder and harder to defend.**

#### Islamophobia has zero causal explanatory power as a method and you can’t solve it because it’s so nebulous

Bleich, professor of political science – Middlebury, ‘11

(Erik, “What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept,” American Behavioral Scientist, 55(12) p. 1581-1600)

Islamophobia is a widely used concept in public and scholarly circles. It was originally developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s by political activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), public commentators, and international organizations to draw attention to harmful rhetoric and actions directed at Islam and Muslims in Western liberal democracies. For actors like these, the term not only identifies anti- Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments, it also provides a language for denouncing them. In recent years, Islamophobia has evolved from a primarily political concept toward one increasingly deployed for analytical purposes. Researchers have begun using the term to identify the history, presence, dimensions, intensity, causes, and consequences of anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments. In short, Islamophobia is an emerging comparative concept in the social sciences. Yet, there is no widely accepted definition of the term. As a result, it is extremely difficult to compare levels of Islamophobia across time, location, or social group, or to levels of analogous categories such as racism, anti-Semitism, or xenophobia. Without a concept that applies across these comparative dimensions, it is also virtually impossible to identify the causes and consequences of Islamophobia with any precision.

#### Not the root cause

Joppke, professor of politics – American University of Paris, PhD Sociology – Berkeley, ‘9

(Christian, “Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and Her Muslims,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Volume 35, Issue 3)

The Runnymede report defines Islamophobia as certain ‘closed’ views of Islam, which are distinguished from ‘open views’ in terms of eight binary oppositions, such as ‘monolithic/diverse’, ‘separate/interacting’, or ‘inferior/different’ (the first adjective always marking a ‘closed’, the second an ‘open’ view). This makes for an elastic definition of Islamophobia, with little that could not be packed into it. Consider the eighth binary opposition, ‘Criticism of West rejected/considered’. If ‘criticisms made by Islam of “The West” (are) rejected out of hand’, there is an instance of Islamophobia, the non-biased attitude being that ‘criticisms of “the West” and other cultures are considered and debated’. Is it reasonable to assume that people enter debate by putting their point of view to disposition? Under such demanding standards, only an advocate of Habermasian communicative rationality would go free of the charge of Islamophobia. However, the real problem is to leave unquestioned the exit position, ‘criticism of the West’. In being sweeping and undifferentiated, such a stance seems to be no less phobic than the incriminated opposite. If the point of the Runnymede report is to ‘counter Islamophobic assumptions that Islam is a single monolithic system’, it seems inconsistent to take for granted a similarly monolithic ‘criticism of “the West”’, which the ‘West’ is asked to ‘consider and debate’. There is a double standard here, in that ‘the West’ is asked to swallow what on the other side would qualify as phobia.

# 2NC

### 2NC Top Level Overview

**Johnston ’04** (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, **given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism,** he sees **the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the** first crucial step **that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.** In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that **Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action** (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") **must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.**

#### Atheism solves all of their arguments without the risk of violence

Zizek, ’08 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and a professor at the European Graduate School, Violence, p. 136-139)

Fundamentalists do (what they perceive as) good deeds in order to fulfill God’s will and to deserve salvation; atheists do them simply because it is the right thing to do. Is this also not our most elementary experience of morality? When I do a good deed, I do not do it with a view to gaining God’s favour, I do it because I cannot do otherwise—if I were not to do it, I would not be able to look at myself in the mirror. A moral deed is by definition its own reward. The eighteenth-century economist-philosopher David Flume, believer, made this point in a very poignant way when he wrote that the only way to show a true respect for God is to act morally while ignoring God’s existence. The history of European atheism, from its Greek and Roman origins in Lucretius’s *De rerum natura* to modern classics like Spinoza, offers a lesson in dignity and courage. Much more than with occasional outbursts of hedonism, it is marked by the awareness of the bitter outcome of every human life, since there is no higher authority watching over our fates and guaranteeing the happy outcome. At the same time, atheists strive to formulate the message of joy which comes not from escaping reality, but from accepting it and creatively finding one’s place in it. What makes this materialist tradition unique is the way it combines the humble awareness that we are not masters of the universe, but just parts of a much larger whole exposed to contingent twists of fate, with a readiness to accept the heavy burden of responsibility for what we make out of our lives. With the threat of unpredictable catastrophe looming from all sides, isn’t this an attitude needed more than ever in our own times?

### Root cause / tamdgigi

#### Even if they’re right about the chicken and the egg debate of which came first, only the alt can address anti-Muslim racism in its current form.

Molyneux, 8 (John Molyneux, British Trotskyist, academic and author, He has been a leading member of the Socialist Workers Party before retiring to Ireland, where he became active in the Irish SWP, 24 June 08, International Socialism, More than opium: Marxism and religion, <http://www.isj.org.uk/?id=456>, jj)

Scarcely a day passes without a news item raising the alarm about alleged “hate preaching” imams, or a mosque being taken over by “fundamentalists”, or an opinion piece about the deeply flawed nature of Islam, or a radio discussion about whether “moderate” Muslims are doing enough to combat “the extremists” and prevent Muslim youth from being “radicalised”, or a TV programme on the plight of Muslim women, or a scare story about some stupidity committed in the name of Islam somewhere in the world. As I start to write this article I see the following report in the Independent on Sunday: Islamic extremism in Britain is creating communities which are “no-go areas” for non-Muslims, the Bishop of Rochester, the Rt Rev Dr Michael Nazir-Ali, warned yesterday. Bishop Nazir-Ali says non-Muslims face a hostile reception in places dominated by the ideology of Islamic radicals. Regardless of the merits or accuracy of the individual story or claim, and this is a particularly absurd one, the relentless flow of this kind of comment and coverage has turned Islam into a religion under siege. This incessant problematisation of Islam and demonisation of Muslims have created the phenomenon now widely referred to as Islamophobia. For readers of this journal, it should be no mystery why this has occurred. It is not an expression of some visceral Christian hostility to Islam stretching back to the Crusades or the conflict with the Ottoman Empire (even though these atavisms are sometimes mobilised ideologically). It is because the majority of the people sitting on the world’s most important reserves of oil and natural gas happen to be Muslim and, secondarily, because, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, much of these peoples’ resistance to imperialism has found expression in Islamist form. If the people of the Middle East and central Asia had been predominantly Buddhist or Tibet held oilfields comparable to those of Saudi Arabia or Iraq, we would now be dealing with “Buddhophobia”. Seeping out from the White House, the Pentagon, the CIA and Downing Street, coursing through the sewers of Fox News, CNN, the Sun and the Daily Mail would be the notion that, great religion though it undoubtedly was, there was some underlying and persistent flaw in Buddhism. “Intellectuals” such as Samuel Huntington, Christopher Hitchens and Martin Amis would be on hand to explain that, despite its embrace by naive hippies in the 1960s, Buddhism was an essentially reactionary creed characterised by its deepseated rejection of modernity and Western democratic values, and its fanatical commitment to feudalism, theocracy, misogyny and homophobia. However, the fact that it has happened—the fact that Islamophobia has been developed, nationally and internationally, as the principal ideological cover and justification for imperialism and war (as straightforward racism was in the 18th and 19th centuries)—has enormously increased the importance of a correct theoretical understanding of, and political orientation towards, religion in its many different forms. Indeed it can be said that a deficient, mechanical or one-sided understanding of the Marxist analysis of religion has been a substantial contributing factor to a number of left individuals and groups completely losing their former political bearings and ending up as left apologists for imperialism.

#### Islamaphobia is a divide and conquer tactic of capitalism

Resistance, ’07 [Resistance is an Australia-wide organisation of young people. We aim to build a mass radical youth organisation. We organise young people in struggles against sexism, racism, environmental destruction, attacks on workers' rights, attacks on students' rights, and every aspect of capitalist oppression. Through this process we help build a mass socialist party that can unite all these struggles. Resistance is made up of young workers, unemployed, students, women, and young people involved in a huge range of campaigns and activities. We're involved in the environmental movement, the women's movement, the lesbian and gay movement, anti-racist campaigns, solidarity campaigns with struggles overseas, on campus, at schools, and in workplace and trade union campaigns. We organise our own campaigns on issues from sexuality to youth unemployment. And we distribute information on all the issues. Last date referenced is June 21, 2007, <http://www.resistance.org.au/Whycapitalismneedsracism>, jj]

Similarly, there is bipartisan support for Islamophobia fear of, and hostility towards, Muslims. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Islamophobia has been encouraged by Western governments. Muslims and people of Middle Eastern appearance have been systematically portrayed in the corporate media as terrorists or potential terrorists. This new racist push to demonise people of a particular religion or region relies on fear and ignorance to succeed. Whipping up this racism to divide the mostly non-Muslim populations of Western countries from their Muslim sisters and brothers is especially necessary for the capitalist rulers given the majority opposition in the West to their governments wars of occupation in the Middle East. Creating fear and paranoia against minorities also helps governments to undermine civil liberties more generally, and therefore weaken other movements for progressive or radical social change.

### 2NC A2: Islam Solves Cap – Rizvi

#### Rivzi goes neg --- says consumption is INSTITUTIONALIZED in capitalism --- this means if we win any argument proving that the aff’s strategy is compatible with consumerism and capitalism it link turns this evidence and makes the alt a pre-req [read the blue]

Rizvi ‘10

[Ali, PhD Sociology and Philosophy, lecturer in philosophy and critical thinking, University Brunei, “Islamic Environmental Ethics and the Challenge of Anthropocentrism,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 27 (3): 2010, pp. 53-78, pdf accessed online]

Islamic Environmental Ethics and a Critique of Consumerism Consumption is a defining characteristic of modem societies: "Although consumption takes place in all human cultures, it is only in the present [20th] century that consumption on a truly mass scale has begun to appear as a fundamental, rather than merely epiphenomenal, characteristic of society."48

Despite that, much of the literature on environmental ethics largely concentrates on theoretical issues of intrinsic versus extrinsic values. But the practical causes of environmental issues may be more insidious than the theoretical ones. In the literature on environmentalist ethics there is definitely a growing discourse on consumerism (and even capitalism) and its relation to the environmental disaster; however, this discourse is fixated more on the social and institutional levels rather than on the personal and ethical levels.49

Islamic ethics, on the other hand, places tremendous emphasis on avoiding another kind of anthropocentrism: that which makes human desires and their fulfillment the center of ethical and social life. In Qur'anic vocabulary, following one's desire and not subordinating it to the divine order is akin to making it one's lord: "Hast thou seen him who maketh his desire his god, and Allah sendeth him astray purposely, and sealeth up his hearing and his heart, and setteth on his sight a covering? Then who will lead him after Allah (hath condemned him)? Will ye not then heed?" (45:23).50 Following this desire-based morality51 is tantamount, at least in practical terms, to declaring oneself to be one's God.

The dominance of desires over the individual and over social life has consequences both for one's understanding

as well as for one's conduct: it leads to (a) the darkening of one's heart (the intellect), which makes the per-

son incapable of true understanding and wisdom, and (b) to conduct (i.e., a system of action) that causes an imbalance in the human world as well as in the universe at large.52 In the discussion that follows, I shall limit

myself to the second aspect.

The tyranny of desire has been institutionalized in modern consumerism and in capitalist rationality53 in general.54 As long as consumerism, with its concomitant ideals of the desirability of growth and high living standards, holds sway, it is hard to imagine any fundamental change in our sociocultural life despite the increasing espousal of environmentalist rhetoric by almost every side of the ethical political divide. To reject anthropocentrism is also to reject the tyranny of desire over individual and social life, and the way to start doing this is to reject a desire-based morality. Desire and its fulfillment cannot provide an adequate basis for any morality worthy of the name; however, neither anthropocentrism nor radical environmentalism provide any adequate grounds for transcending the tyranny of desire and a desire-based morality.

Two main ethical theories of anthropocentrism are utilitarianism and Kantianism. Utilitarianism cannot provide

any cure from the tyranny of desire because it in fact universalizes this tyranny by basing all morality upon the principle of pleasure maximization, which is another name for maximizing the satisfaction of desire. In economic terms, the utility principle lends moral grounds to the commitment to growth, high living standards,

and high levels of consumption.55 In addition, utilitarianism cannot offer any objective grounds to limit, order,

or discriminate among our many desires, for it is based upon the principle of utility maximization.56 Similarly

Kantianism, which may be seen in the first instance as more immune from the logic of desire, also has no real alternative to a desire-based morality. While it is true that Kantianism does not directly invoke desire maximization as the foundation of morality, it nonetheless places no substantial limits upon desire. More fundamentally, it provides no significant positive foundations for morality other than the consistent satisfaction of desire. Indeed, the only criterion Kant puts forth to limit desire is that of consistency. But consistency does not challenge the dominance of desire over our individual and social life in any fundamental way; it only exhorts us to pursue them

in a consistent manner so that the internal and external conflict between various desires can be avoided.

Given that radical environmentalism also presents no alternative to desire-based morality, it cannot fundamentally challenge a socioeconomic system based upon the tyranny of desire. Much of the mainstream environmental movement does not challenge the ideals of growth and increasing one's living standard to begin with; its members only ask people to seek them in a sustainable way. But pursuing desire in such a way, even if this were practical, does not amount to challenging the tyranny of desire. Such strands of thought have no principled problem with a desire-based morality; in fact, they are ultimately driven by the fear of scarcity, that our ideal of maximizing the satisfaction of desire together with an increasing population might be incompatible with the finiteness of Earth's resources. The more optimistic mainstream anthropocentric environmentalists, however,

see this as a temporary problem that ultimately will be overcome by human genius as well as by technology's innovative and transformative powers.57

#### Be skeptical of their link turn—Islam is not necessarily anti-capitalist—it can be integrated into capitalism’s exploitative framework

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Black Star, Crescent Moon could use less of the author's irritatingly essentialized appeals to the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World.” While the author describes the former as “a parallel space to the state,” the “Muslim Third World” is never defined. It includes variously Saudi Arabia and the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, although neither of the two leading conference luminaries, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, were Muslims or represented Muslims. If the “Muslim International” and the “Muslim Third World” are meant to connote spaces of anti-imperialist popular resistance, the inclusion of certain polities is indeed puzzling. Are people who grew up in refugee camps or confront brutal Israeli apartheid policies to be conflated with those who secretly tipple fine scotch in Jeddah mansions? In reality there is no neat equation between Islam as currently practiced and anti-imperialism and antiracism. Just as Islam has been the principal religion in some revolutionary regimes that resisted domination, in other places it has proven compatible with slavery, racism, and exploitative capitalism, now as in the past. The same may be said for all of the “universal” religions. This work makes an important contribution in allowing readers to see beyond the intellectual ghetto to which much scholarship has consigned present-day Muslims. In so doing it ably dissects popular media representations. It ambitiously reaches beyond national borders to construct a picture of a global community of struggle. In the process, it arrives at important insights but often blurs these by indiscriminately associating all emancipatory impulses with Islam and by claiming insurgents who neither were Muslims nor were motivated by religious goals.

### 2NC A2: Grosfoguel – Eurocentric/bad for muslims

#### Their argument cherry-picks examples of Marxism’s eurocentrism and takes them out of context—it ignores all of Marx’s work during the 1870s—he would steadfastly reject the oppression they outline and his approach is crucial to anti-imperialism even today

Peter Hudis, 4 co-editor of the Letters of Rosa Luxemburg and of her Complete Works, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 15.4 (Dec 2004): 51-67., Marx Among the Muslims, accessed online via Wayne State

Whereas Hegel is often viewed as a "Eurocentric" thinker with little to offer those living outside a European context, Marx has generally been seen as a thinker who transcends such confines. This is underscored by the appeal of Marxian ideals in the socialist and nationalist movements in the Third World over the past century. Yet over the past several decades Marx's ideas have been closely scrutinized for traces of Eurocentrism and an attachment to Western cultural-bound assumptions. The notion that Marx analyzed developments in the non-Western world through European categories has become widespread even among some of his most fervent defenders. To give one example, Negri and Hardt argue in Empire that Marx's writing on India and the Asiatic mode of production efface the "conception of difference in Indian society" in favor of a unilinear concept of historical "progress" that emanates from Europe. They write, "The central issue is that Marx can conceive of history outside of Europe only as moving strictly along the path already traveled by Europe itself . . . . India can progress only by being transformed into a Western society . . . . Marx's Eurocentrism is in the end not so different from that of Las Casas."27

What is remarkable about such judgments is that they ignore the bulk of Marx's writings on non-Western societies. The tendency to single out a handful of Marx's writings on non-European countries - such as his 1853 writings on India - while ignoring the full range of his work on such subjects persists even in the aftermath of the numerous debates in the Left over the significance of the September 11 attacks and their aftermath. One might think that given the contentious debates being waged today over the nature of contemporary Islam that at least some on the Left would explore the issue in light of Marx's writings on Muslim history and societies. After all, Marx lived in Algiers for two months in 1882 (a year before he died), where he had the chance to observe and comment directly on various aspects of Islamic civilization. While in Algiers he also carried on extensive discussions on Arab landed property and French colonialism with the civil judge Albert Fermé.28 Moreover, in 1879, several years before his trip to Algiers, Marx made a comprehensive study of the Muslim rule of northern India, communal land formations in Algeria, and the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence in his notebooks on the work of Maxim Kovalevsky, a Russian sociologist who wrote an important study of communal land formations in northern India and North Africa. In the last several years of his life Marx also studied a number of other aspects of both Indian and Indonesian society (such as his October 1880 notes on Indian history from 664 CE to 1858 and a 1,700 page manuscript on world history, written in late 1881, which has yet be published).

Some of these writings have yet to either appear or to be translated into English, and even many that are available take the form of excerpt notebooks on the writings of various authors. Given the unpolished and fragmentary character of these notebooks it is hard to draw conclusions about their overall significance. Yet we still have much to learn from the method and approach that Marx employed in his studies on colonialism, communal forms, and technologically underdeveloped societies during his last decade. Whereas Marx's writings from the early 1850s on India (in which he seemed to endorse a unilinear evolutionist view that social "progress" would come to India through Western colonialism and industrialization) continue to receive much discussion and debate, Marx's writings from his last decade (1872-83) - in which he altered many of these earlier views - continue to be met with either silence or insufficient attention.

We will therefore try to fill some of this gap by exploring a few aspects of Marx's "Notebooks on Kovalevsky," which he wrote in the fall of 1879. (The bulk of Marx's Notebooks was published in 1975 as an appendix to Lawrence Krader's The Asiatic Mode of Production; the full text, which is over 100 pages long, was published in German in 1977 by Hans-Peter Harstick as Karl Marx über Formen vorkapitalistischer Produktion: Vergleichende Studien zur Geschichte des Grundeigentums 1579-80.)29

There is no question that Marx's ideas developed in a European context and that a number of his comments on non-Western societies in the 1840s exhibited a European bias and lack of familiarity with and sensitivity toward their internal development. One need only recall the Communist Manifesto's phrase about the Europeans' "heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate."30 Yet even in the 1840s Marx engaged in important studies of non-European societies. In 1846 he made extensive notes on developments in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Algeria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and South Africa in his study of Gustav von Gulich's Geschichtliche Darstellung des Handels. Though virtually ignored in the Englishlanguage literature on Marx, his 1,000-page notebooks on von Gulich shows that even in the 1840s Marx took an active interest in developments outside of Europe.31 By the 1850s this expanded into a series of studies on China and India and in the section on "Precapitalist Economic Formations" in his Grundrisse. From such studies emerged his concept of "The Asiatic mode of production," which he cited in his famous 1859 Preface to The Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. In the period of the Taiping revolt in China (which he actively studied and supported), Marx argued that unlike Western Europe, which was characterized by a development from slave to feudal to capitalist societies, India and China exhibited signs of an independent "Asiatic mode of production" characterized by "an economical and common use of water" due to largescale irrigation. This, he argued, "necessitated in the Orient where civilization was too low and the territorial extent too vast to call into life voluntary association, the interference of the centralizing role of government."32 Alongside such centralized government were small-scale farming villages "contaminated by distinctions of caste and slavery."33 Marx did not explore this so-called "Asiatic" mode of production in order to denigrate non-European societies as "backward." On the contrary, as he wrote in 1853, "The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?"34 Marx probed the dualities and contradictions within China and India to see if they could lead to a worldwide revolutionary upsurge against existing society. As he wrote in his article of 1853 "Revolution in China and in England" in discussing the Taiping rebellion in China, "England, having brought about the revolution in China, the question is how that revolution, will in time react on England and through England on Europe."35

Likewise, when Marx turned to a more intensive study of non-Western societies in the 1870s the question that was foremost on his mind was how developments in the non-European world could feed into the development of a global revolution against capital. In part, Marx's increased interest in "the East" from the early 1870s onward was stimulated by the emergence of a revolutionary movement in Russia, which posed important questions about its future course of historical development. Was Russia destined to undergo capitalistic industrialization before it could be ready for the attainment of a socialist society? Or was it possible for Russia to bypass the stage of capitalism by utilizing such indigenous formations as communal ownership and working of the land? Marx was fully acquainted with the debates on this subject by Russian Populists, Anarchists and "Marxists," and he made a series of important studies on Russian society with this question expressly in mind.36

Yet while much has been written on Marx's writings on Russia in the 1870s and 1880s, his studies of India, Indonesia, and the Muslim world from this period remain much less known and discussed. Of central importance in these studies is his 1879 Notebooks on Kovalevsky's The Communal Possession of the Land.

Though Marx had many criticisms of Kovalevsky's book, it is important to first see what Marx appreciated about it. First, Kovalevksy sharply attacked imperialism, arguing that British imperialism in north India and French imperialism in Algeria were regressive phenomena because of their destruction of indigenous communal landholding patterns. Marx agreed with Kovalevsky's view of the regressive impact of imperialism upon these societies, in contrast to some of his views expressed in his writings on India in the early 1850s. For example, in reference to Kovalevsky's discussion of the means used by the French to rob the Algerians of their land, Marx added: "The means sometimes change, the aim is ever the same: destruction of the indigenous collective property (and its transformation) into an object of free purchase and sale, and by this means the final passage made easier into the hands of the French colonists."37 Kovalevsky's description of the French effort to destroy the clan-community landholding patters in Algeria evoked from Marx the comment: "The Shameless!"38

Second, Kovalevsky viewed the communal possession of the land positively, as a possible foundation for a "higher stage of social development." Marx agreed with this view as well, as seen not only in his notes on northern Indian and North African society but also in his writings of the same period on the Russian mir. As Marx put it praising a comment from Kovalevsky, "By the individualization of landownership in this way the political aim was also achieved - to destroy the foundation of this society."39 Marx also singled out Kovalevsky's discussion of the debates in the French National Assembly on Algeria of 1873, where one representative cited "the further maintenance of communal property" as "a form that supports communist tendencies in the minds."40

Third, Marx held that Kovalevsky performed an important service in attacking the idea that the sovereign was the principal landlord and landowner in north India and in other Muslim societies. Kovalevsky noted that it was of great practical value for the English to argue that the sovereign was the landlord and principle landowner, since they used that idea to seize communal lands with the acquiescence of native rulers like princes, rajahs, beys, deys, and so on. The British and French imperialists propagated the idea that the monarch was the landowner in order to proclaim themselves the rightful inheritor of the communal lands upon subjugating the native rulers. Kovalevsky showed that a purely ideological notion - the widespread European belief (advocated perhaps most famously by James Mill) that the monarch was the main owner of the land - served the practical purpose of enabling European imperialists to take over indigenous communal lands in India, Algeria, and elsewhere. The French at first actually tried to obtain ownership of all communal lands in Algeria on the legalism that according to Muslim doctrine the imam had the power to claim the entire cultivated land as his domain. Marx noted that Islamic Hanafi law recognizes the power of eminent domain of the imam, but, he added, "it gives him the right only to lay a capitulation tax on the conquered population."41 Marx noted: "After completion of the conquest the imam can make over to no one the right to property over land already under cultivation . . . . In practice this leads to the greater part of the soil remaining in the hands of the natives . . . the overlords appropriated only domainal and uncultivated lands."42

Defending the idea of indigenous community property against Western intrusion, Marx wrote: "Common property is permitted only where the English officials - 'dogs'-could discover no persons who could present any title, however ambivalent, to the property. The English asses needed a long time to grasp the real condition of those in possession of the property."43 He likewise argued: "Thus common property was recognized in principle, how far it was in practice always depended and depends on what 'the English' dogs hold most useful for themselves . . . the British blockheads."44

In sum, what Marx most appreciated about Kovalevsky was his refusal to accept at face value the categories used by Europeans to explain non-European societies. At the same time, it was on this very point that Marx also took sharp issue with Kovalevsky. Kovalevsky argued that feudalism prevailed in Mogul India, on the basis of the ikta - benefices or grants for military service. He tied the emergence of "feudalism" in northern India directly to the Muslim conquest. Marx took sharp issue with this claim, writing: "This makes sense only with regard to the Mohammedans who received ikta II or III; it makes sense with regard to the Hindus at the most insofar as they had to pay natural or money dues to those invested with a property by the state treasury instead of to the state treasury. Payment of the kharadj made their property as little feudal as the impot foncier makes the French property in land feudal."45

Marx raised a number of other objections to the idea that feudalism prevailed in Muslim India. Marx argued that serfdom, which is central to European feudalism, did not exist in India: "Because 'benefices,' 'farming out of offices' (but this is not at all feudal, as Rome attests) and commendation are founded in India, Kovalevsky here finds feudalism in the Western European sense. Kovalevsky forgets, among other things, serfdom, which is not in India, and which is an essential moment."46 Marx also noted that the soil is not a prized object in India, as it is in European feudalism: "Of the poetry of the soil which the Romanic-Germanic feudalism has as its own (see Maurer) as little is found in India as in Rome. The soil is nowhere noble in India, so that it might not be alienable to commoners!"47 Moreover, Marx argued that inheritance does not work in the same way in Indian society as in European feudalism: "According to Indian law the ruling power is not subject to division among the sons; thereby a great source of European feudalism [is] obstructed."48

Marx likewise took issue with Kovalevsky's attempt to apply the concept of feudalism to North Africa. Marx rejected his view that the Ottoman Turks introduced feudalism during their conquest of North Africa, arguing: "There is no trace of the transformation of the entire conquered land into 'domanial property.' The lousy Orientalists' etc., refer vainly to the places in the Qu'ran where the earth is spoken of as belonging 'to the property of God.'"49 Marx objected to using European categories like "feudalism" to define non-Western societies; as Lawrence Krader put it, for Marx "the course of Indian history is to be explained by indigenous, not imported categories."50

(I should add that when Marx's "Notebooks on Kovalevsky" were first published in 1958 in Russian, the Stalinist editors strongly objected to Marx's views about the non-application of feudalism to non-Western societies, since it clashed with the unilinear evolutionist perspective that by then defined established "Marxism.")51

Marx also attacked the European effort to either impose their laws on Algerian society or to accept "indigenous" ones on the basis of whether it suited imperialistic self-interest: "To the extent that non-European, foreign law is 'profitable' for them, the Europeans recognize it, as here they not only recognize the Muslim law - immediately! - but 'misunderstand' it only to their own profit."52

The most important point on which Marx distinguished himself from Kovalevsky concerned the presence of internal contradictions within indigenous communal formations. While Marx, as we have seen, rejected the notion that such formations were "backward" in comparison with European private ownership, he did not view indigenous communal formations uncritically. He repeatedly called attention to such factors as castes, chiefs, and inequities of wealth and rank within the community. This is seen in his underlining of Kovalevsky's passing comment that some members of the community acquired fertile lands while others did not, leading to increased social stratification. Where Kovalevsky made a few passing references to "tribal heads," Marx wrote down three times in two sentences the words "chiefs" in parentheses. He especially focused on the role of religious figures, writing: "The priestly pack thus plays the chief role in the individualization of family property."53 He also took issue with the way Kovalevsky presented the dissolution of communal property forms as a whole. Marx wrote: "Much simpler to say: Inequality of the shares has become great, which would necessarily imply various other inequalities of wealth, of demands, etc., in short, much other social inequality. Disputes arising therefore must provoke, on the part of those so privileged, the tendency to entrench themselves as possessors."54

In a word, the question of property forms did not define the perimeters of Marx's analysis. He went so far as to reject Kovalevsky's identification of communal social relations with communal property forms, writing: "This is not consistent with what was said earlier, according to which nomadic and even savage peoples had cooperation before the existence of landed property - common or private -made necessary by the conditions of the hunt."55 Marx's comment recalls his statement in the Grundrisse that "Property thus originally means no more than a human beings relation to his natural conditions of production as belonging to him, as his, as presupposed within his own being . . . we reduce this property to the relations of the conditions of production."56

In addition to objecting to Kovalevsky on substantive issues like the relevance of the category of "feudalism" and the internal differentiations within communal property forms, Marx also corrected a number of historical inaccuracies in Kovalevsky's text - which indicate the extent to which he had carefully studied the history of these societies during his last decade. In one passage Marx wrote: "According to Kovalevsky the consolidated reign of the Mohammedans in north India begins with the conquest of Delhi by Mohammed Ghuri. This is false. In 1193 Shahah (brother of Ghiyas-ud-Din, Sultan of [the] House of Ghur) killed Prithisiraja who ruled over Delhi and Ajmir. He left behind the ex-slave Kuth-ud-Din as governor of Ajmir, and the latter took Delhi and caused himself to be made the first Muslim king there (1206-1210)."57 Marx also noted later in the text: "'Thus,' Kovalevsky proceeds, according to the account of Din Barani 'the immediate successors of Ala-ud-Din acted, namely, the Sultans Kutb-ud-Din and Ghiyas-ud-Din Tughluk.' However, Ala-ud-Din died in 1317 whereas Kutb-ud-Din ruled in 1206-1210 (that is, a century earlier)."58

Marx's "Notebooks on Kovalevsky," like many of his writings on non-European societies in his last decade, is a series of notes, not a finished project, and it is difficult to draw generalizations about his views of Islamic society from it. But several things should be clear from our discussion.

First, by the 1870s (and most likely as early as the mid-1850s) Marx did not view imperialist intrusion into the technologically underdeveloped world as "progressive." He instead viewed the imperialist destructive of precapitalist social formations as being regressive. In the Grundrisse (1853) Marx warned against "the concept of progress in the commonplace (abstract) sense."59 Earlier, in The Holy Family (1845), he wrote: "In spite of the pretensions of 'progress,' continual retrogressions and circular movements occur . . . the category of progress is wholly abstract and devoid of content."60 And in his Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 he wrote: "Ask yourself whether, for reasonable thought, progression exists as such."61 In his last decade (1872-83) Marx concretized this viewpoint in projecting an intensifying opposition to the notion that imperialism was in any sense historically "progressive." As he wrote in his "Draft Letters to Vera Zasulich" on developments in the East Indies, "the suppression of communal land ownership was nothing but an act of English vandalism which drove the indigenous population backward rather than forward."62

Second, instead of viewing such native communal formations as "backward," Marx embraced such communal forms, albeit critically, in viewing them as a possible basis for creating a socialist society without going through capitalistic industrialization. The most detailed and explicit development of Marx's views on this matter is found in his writings on the Russian village community. Marx was not convinced that the communal formations in Indian and North African society could as readily become a basis for an indigenous path to socialism that bypasses capitalism, since the communal formations in those areas were being destroyed much more rapidly than in Russia - in large reason because of the impact of colonialism and imperialism. However, Marx did not rule out the possibility that such indigenous social formations could become the basis of a different path to socialism if certain specific historical conditions were met (such as peasant struggles in "the East" coalescing with proletarian revolution in the West). Marx was in the process of exploring these possibilities in the 1870s and 1880s - a project that was cut short by his death in 1883.63

However - and this is the critical point - Marx did not view the indigenous communal formations in the Third World uncritically. This becomes evident when we study his "Notebooks on Kovalevsky" in relation to other writings of his last decade, such as his "Draft Letters to Vera Zasulich" on the Russian mir and his Ethnological Notebooks on Native American societies. Marx repeatedly focused on the dualism that characterized indigenous communal formations. On the one hand, they provided a basis for collective interaction and reciprocity that could become a foundation for a future socialist society. Yet on the other hand the indigenous communal formations were also afflicted with an array of social inequities and incipient hierarchies - especially when it came to relations between men and women. Marx paid careful consideration to these internal contradictions in his Ethnological Notebooks especially. Unlike Engels, who tended to uncritically glorify the indigenous communal forms in "primitive" society in his Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Marx pointed to the incipient formation of class, caste, and hierarchical social relations within them.64 Though he singled out the superiority of Iroquois society compared to much of contemporary European societies in his Ethnological Notebooks, he did not assume that the presence of communal ownership of land automatically provided women with sexual equality. In several places in his Ethnological Notebooks he pointed out limitations to the freedom of women, since even though they had access to political decisions their votes were often only consultative. This is shown by Marx's manner of underlining and emphasizing certain phrases and expressions from his Notebooks on the work of Henry Lewis Morgan, which constitutes a large section of his Ethnological Notebooks: "The women allowed to express their wishes and opinions through an orator of their own election. Decision given by the council. Unanimity was a fundamental law of its action among the Iroquois. Military questions usually left to the action of the voluntary principle."65

Marx's approach of singling out the importance of communal forms while never uncritically glorifying them defined his studies of his last decade. This is most evident in his studies of the Russian peasant commune. While Marx's overall position was closer to that of the Populists than the Russian "Marxists" - who argued, contrary to Marx's own conclusion, that Russia needed to undergo an extensive period of capitalist industrialization before it could be ready for socialism - Marx also differed from the Populists in that he was far more critical than they were of the Russian mir. As he put it in one of his draft letters to Vera Zasulich, "the commune bore within its own breast the elements that were poisoning its life."66 If the communal element won out over the incipient relations of hierarchy and patriarchy, then it was possible, Marx held, that it could serve as the basis the creation of socialism - provided that there was also a proletarian revolution in the West. However, if the communal element fell victim to its incipient relations of hierarchy and patriarchy, either due to external factors (like the imposition of imperialism) or internal ones (like the repression of women's freedom by the "indigenous" community) then it would not and could not serve as a basis for a future socialist society. "Everything depends on the historical context in which it finds itself," he wrote.67 And by "historical context" Marx did not simply mean "material conditions" or abstract "laws of history," but social revolution - the conscious intervention of the human subject which rises up to resolve the contradiction.

As Raya Dunayevskaya put it in her study of Marx's last decade in Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution: "What Marx, in the Grundrisse, had defined as 'the absolute movement of becoming' had matured in the last decade of his life as new moments - a multilinear view of human development as well as dialectic duality within each formation. From within each formation evolved both the end of the old and the beginning of the new. Whether Marx was studying the communal or the despotic form of property, it was the human resistance of the Subject that revealed the direction for resolving the contradictions. Marx transformed what, to Hegel, was the synthesis of the 'Self-Thinking Idea' and the 'Self-Bringing Forth of Liberty' as the emergence of a new society. The many paths to get there were left open."68

It may not be possible to directly apply the ideas that Marx developed in his notebooks on Islamic society to today's crisis of imperialist war and terrorism. We can, however, say this much: Marx would relentlessly oppose any effort to "reshape" the Muslim world by imperialist intervention, just as he would relentlessly oppose any patriarchal and reactionary tendencies in the Muslim world which pose themselves as the alternative to US imperialism. For Marx, human freedom was the measure of any society or social formation, and it would do us well to keep this in mind in confronting the horrors of US intervention today. Accommodating oneself to or ignoring the regressive nature of many tendencies within the Middle East and elsewhere which for now oppose the US is not going to aid the effort to project a positive alternative to the global dominance of capitalism. It will only impede it. What we need is a recreation of Marx's approach in which vigorous opposition to imperialism becomes inseparable from vigorous opposition to any "anti-imperialist" tendency that denies human freedom.

Marx's late writings on Islamic society provide important direction for working this out. It is especially shown by his reflections on Arab and Muslim society during his two-month stay in Algiers in 1882. In his letters written from Algiers, Marx said that he had become enthralled by "Mahomet's sons" and the "Negros . . . [with their] dignified manner." He wrote of how "Their costumes - even when in tatters - is elegant and graceful . . . . Even the poorest Moor excels the greatest European comedian as to the 'art de se draper' dans son capot, and to show a natural, graceful and dignified attitudes, whether walking or standing."69 He added: "Some of these Maures were dressed pretentiously, even richly, others in, for once I dare call it blouses, sometime of white woolen appearance, now in rags and tatters - but in the eyes of every true Musulmen such accidents, good or bad luck, do not distinguish Mahomet's children. Absolute equality in their social intercourse, not affected . . . as to the hatred against Christians and the hope of an ultimate victory over these infidels, their politicians justly consider this same feeling and practice of absolute equality (not of wealth or position but of personality) a guarantee of keeping up the one, of not giving up the latter." Yet Marx did not fail to add: "Nevertheless, they will go to rack and ruin WITHOUT A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT."70

#### The alt’s universalism has and must be redeployed in non-Eurocentric contexts --- their insistence on epistemological inclusivity turns all their offense

Zizek ‘02

Žižek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Science (University of Ljubljana), 2002 [Slavoj, inteview with Bad Subjects, “I am a Fighting Atheist: Interview with Slavoj Žižek,” Bad Subjects, Issue #59, February, <http://eserver.org/bs/59/zizek.html>]

BS: Several times you've used the word "universalism." For trafficking in such concepts, people you'd identify as forces of political correctness have indicted you for Eurocentrism. You've even written a radical leftist plea for Eurocentrism. How do you respond to the PC camp's charges against you? Zizek: I think that we should accept that universalism is a Eurocentrist notion. This may sound racist, but I don't think it is. Even when Third World countries appeal to freedom and democracy, when they formulate their struggle against European imperialism, they are at a more radical level endorsing the European premise of universalism. You may remember that in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the ANC always appealed to universal Enlightenment values, and it was Buthelezi, the regime's black supporter in the pay of the CIA, who appealed to special African values. My opponent here is the widely accepted position that we should leave behind the quest for universal truth — that what we have instead are just different narratives about who we are, the stories we tell about ourselves. So, in that view, the highest ethical injunction is to respect the other story. All the stories should be told, each ethnic, political, or sexual group should be given the right to tell its story, as if this kind of tolerance towards the plurality of stories with no universal truth value is the ultimate ethical horizon. I oppose this radically. This ethics of storytelling is usually accompanied by a right to narrate, as if the highest act you can do today is to narrate your own story, as if only a black lesbian mother can know what it's like to be a black lesbian mother, and so on. Now this may sound very emancipatory. But the moment we accept this logic, we enter a kind of apartheid. In a situation of social domination, all narratives are not the same. For example, in Germany in the 1930s, the narrative of the Jews wasn't just one among many. This was the narrative that explained the truth about the entire situation. Or today, take the gay struggle. It's not enough for gays to say, "we want our story to be heard." No, the gay narrative must contain a universal dimension, in the sense that their implicit claim must be that what happens to us is not something that concerns only us. What is happening to us is a symptom or signal that tells us something about what's wrong with the entirety of society today. We have to insist on this universal dimension.

# 1NR

### \*\*\*\*A2: Perm

#### Identity politics makes the realization of a true universal impossible—the 1AC’s obsession with exposing marginalized viewpoints makes short-circuits universalism

* Liberal politics as usual

Zizek, ’09 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, professor at the European Graduate School, and total BAMF, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, p. 102, bgm)

***\*e tutti quanit = all the rest***

Liberals who acknowledge the problems of those excluded from the socio-political process formulate their goal as being the inclusion of those whose voices are not heard: all positions should be listened to, all interests taken into account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, cultures, and practices respected, and so on. The obsession of this democratic discourse is the protection of all kinds of minorities: cultural, religious, sexual, *e tutti quanti*. The formula of democracy is patient negotiation and compromise. What gets lost here is the proletarian position, the position of universality embodied in the Excluded. This is why, upon a closer look, it becomes clear that what Hugo Chavez has begun doing in Venezuela differs markedly from the standard liberal form of inclusion: Chavez is not including the “excluded” dwellers of favelas as his *base* and then reorganizing political space and political forms so that the latter will “fit” the excluded. Pedantic and abstract as it may appear, this difference—between “bourgeois democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” —is crucial.

#### Revolution must take the working class as its point of departure—identity politics are inherently reactionary because they are a struggle for positions of power within the current social matrix rather than the struggle for a radical new symbolic order

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Much Marxism has been stuck in the idea that any revolutionary change has to take the working class as its point of departure. The ‘ideal’ has been dirty, hard working industrial workers. It has been discussed whether small, private farmers were poor enough; whether one could be progressive, if one had changed from overalls to a suit. The central point for Žižek, however, is not the particular attributes of a certain group, but its placement in relation to the whole of capi -talism. The proletariat for Marx is the symbol of a universal human -ity – and as such it points towards a society beyond exploitation and humiliation. For Žižek, the important point is not whether the prole - tariat was or is the most suppressed class, but whether its existence embodies the internal contradictions and imbalances of capitalism. One must therefore distinguish between the working class as a social group (as placed within the social matrix, as majority) and the pro -letariat as an agent, which in a militant way struggles for ‘universal truth’ (as the group that breaks with the social matrix, as minority) (Žižek 1999: 226f). There is no necessary connection between these two groups. The crucial point is therefore whether one is answering to the idea of a system beyond the exploitation and impoverishment of capitalism, or whether one is fighting for one’s own privileges. Should the struggle be understood as a struggle for positions within the same social matrix, or is the struggle a struggle for a new and radically different society? Class struggle is not initially a struggle between classes, but rather a struggle to cover up or make apparent the flaws and inconsistencies of capitalism. The danger of perceiving class struggle as the strug - gle for recognition and rights, for example, is that it thereby supports fixed identities and social roles – and in effect capitalism as a system. Class struggle and classes themselves are not that which all social phenomena can be reduced to, but rather a generative matrix that conditions the different ideological horizons, through which society is attributed meaning (Žižek 2002b: 190). [A] class society in which the ideological perception of the class division was pure and direct would be a harmonious structure with no struggle – or to put it in Laclau’s terms, class antagonism would thereby be fully symbolized; it would no longer be impossible/real, but a simple differential structural feature. (Žižek 1999: 187) Žižek’s view of the proletariat is strongly inspired by Hegel’s thoughts of the Lumpenproletariat . This group was exactly charac - terised by not being contemplated as a class sui generis . For Žižek, similarly, the proletariat is the group that does not fit into the capital - ist whole. Revolutionary struggle is therefore not a struggle for more salary, for instance, as such a struggle will only make certain dis - placements within a given system possible. Any political act that is taking its point of departure in particular identities and their demands – whether they be ethnic, religious, sexual or simply different life - styles – remains reactionary (Žižek 2003: 132f). Revolutionary strug - gle, on the contrary, questions the symbolic itself – the fact that the being of the worker is reduced to a commodity.

#### Radical negation is key to open the space for the alternative – only wiping the slate clean can solve

Zizek, ’99 (Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana,The Ticklish Subject, page 91-92)

With regard to the opposition between abstract and concrete Universal­ity, this means that the only way towards a truly 'concrete' universality leads through the full assertion of the radical negativity by means of which the universal negates its entire particular content: despite misleading appearances, it is the 'mute universality’ of the neutral container of the particular content which is the predominant form of abstract universality. In other words, the only way for a Universality to become 'concrete' is to stop being a neutral-abstract medium of its particular content, and to include itself among its particular subspecies. What this means is that, paradox­ically, the first step towards 'concrete universality ' is the radical negation of the entire particular content: only through such a negation does the Universal gain existence, become visible 'as such'. Here let us recall Hegel's analysis of phrenology, which closes the chapter on 'Observing Reason' in his Phenomenology: Hegel resorts to an explicit phallic metaphor in order to explain the opposition of the two possible readings of the proposition 'the Spirit is a bone' (the vulgar-materialist 'reductionist' reading - the shape of our skull actually and directly determines the features of our mind - and the speculative reading - the spirit is strong enough to assert its identity with the most utterly inert stuff, and to 'sublate' it - that is to say, even the most utterly inert stuff cannot escape the Spirit's power of mediation). The vulgar-materialist reading is like the approach which sees in the phallus only the organ of urination, while the speculative reading is also able to discern in it the much higher function of insemination (i.e. precisely 'conception' as the biological anticipation of concept).

### Religion da

#### The perm fails and maintains an externalization of political responsibility. Faith in a big Other creates the conditions of possibility for the worst atrocities like Western colonization of the New World. Vote neg to live in the present.

Ruehl ’11 (Robert, Syracuse University, International Journal of Zizek Studies, “Žižek’s Communist Theology: A Revolutionary Challenge to America’s Capitalist God”, Volume 5 Number 1, <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/247/386>, jj)

Cortés was not the only person duped by a big Other that helped to support violence, genocide, and the acquisition of property and wealth. The idea that helps to guide the belief in a Christian nation, a nation chosen by God, discloses itself in the Puritan religious rhetoric. In 1630 aboard the Arbella, John Winthrop held the belief that the world would be watching them as they founded their new community in New England, and God would be watching, too. They would need to be good Christians and be models for the rest of the world. It is in support of this belief that Winthrop proclaimed: “We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when he shall make us a praise and a glory, that men shall say of succeeding plantations, ‘The Lord make it likely that of New England.’ For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.” (Winthrop, 2000: 61) The problem is that for those plantations to succeed and for the Puritans to flourish, they would acquire their land, wealth, and power by murdering those already on the land they wanted. The Puritans took part in a genocidal process that helped to reduce the native population in North America at the time of Columbus from ten million to less than a million. Howard Zinn concludes: “Behind the English invasion of North America, behind their massacre of Indians, their deception, their brutality, was that special powerful drive born in civilizations based on private property.” (Zinn, 2003: 16) This “Christianity” and the need for property helped to foster the belief in Manifest Destiny. Along these lines, then, the glory given to God was a murderous glory that violently displaced and exterminated countless peoples. This was done in the name of Christianity and in order to convert and save “savage” people. To celebrate the religiosity of America as it is linked to this violent, unjust past — or to say that it is a Christian nation — is problematic because the religiosity that has pervaded American history has helped to perpetuate violence and brutality. When we think of the Jesus who was the abject other and who died challenging the brutal empire of Rome, to say that America is a Christian nation raises questions about which Christianity is being discussed. The Christianity many Americans speak of is a Christianity in support of property and conquest through murder. It is this Christianity that Žižek’s communist theology challenges. Žižek offers a Christian theology that does not emphasize property, but a communal spirit and responsibility to others. Žižek supports an interconnected community able to resist injustice because those who unite are challenging the status quo. The abject Christ is a charismatic person who helps to overcome oppression by leaving behind a memory that inspires. His inspiration and the communal bond that forms around the abject Christ creates a parallax gap between two Christianities: Žižek’s Christianity and American ideas of Christianity. To continue to argue that America is a Christian nation and morally upright is to overlook Žižek’s challenge that dismisses a big Other and urges us to live responsibly in the present. With the acquisitive nature of American Christianity in mind and its support of property and capital, the underlying criticism offered by Žižek’s communist theology is that Americans’ use of “Christianity” to describe the country is problematic and not to be celebrated. It is a bastardized Christianity. “Christianity” provided an opportunity for violence to others. The violence of Cortés and the Puritans, then, are examples of subjective violence. The objective violence is a specific manifestation of the Christian religion and its symbolic system that is linked to the emergence of capitalism. By changing the religious background, the economic system should change. If we substitute Žižek’s Christianity for that of the Christianity that supported the Doctrine of Discovery and Manifest Destiny, a different approach to economics emerges. Instead of conquest and an emphasis on property, responsibility and community emerge. Žižek’s communist theology, therefore, is more than a prima facie challenge to America’s belief in its Christian origins. It is a direct challenge to the brutal drive for property and wealth buttressed by “Christian” symbols and myths. By juxtaposing Žižek’s theology with that of the myth of a Christian nation, we see that American identity begins to waver. American Christianity supported violence and capitalism and allowed the subjective violence of genocide to occur. Žižek’s theology forces us to see the inadequacy of America’s understanding of Christianity. Behind America is not a religion called Christianity, but a greedy drive for property placed in the language and imagery of Christianity. It is not Christianity behind America, but a drive for property that manifests itself in a capitalist economic system. Žižek, then, makes it clear that the dead God of Christianity is not the guiding force behind America, but a different god, namely, Capitalism. The death of the big Other in Christianity now urges us to hope for the death of the big Other in America. We must now pray for America’s god to breathe its last breath.

#### The theology of the 1AC is bankrupt. We should embrace the death of God as an opportunity to create authentic communalism. This communistic theology is mutually exclusive with the politics of the 1AC.

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The purpose of this paper was to explore Žižek’s understanding of the death of God. His understanding was placed within the American context, which is one of religion, property, law, and capitalism. Within American thought is a belief in the “Christian nation,” but it obscures the violent past that went into the founding of America. Violence to Native Americans was a genocidal process accomplished within the symbolic system of Christianity. This religious language, however, obscures a more urgent drive for wealth and property, which the Constitution supports. The American god, therefore, is Capitalism. In America, as the latest economic crisis reveals, Capitalism is still the dominant ideology that took billions of dollars to save and to support. By taking Žižek’s theology seriously, the Christian God is dead, and there is no big Other. The death of God created room for a communal spirit to emerge, and this provided the opportunity for a radical responsibility for others and the ability to oppose injustice. His communist theology, therefore, makes us look more seriously at the American myth and dependence upon a belief in America’s privileged place in the life of God. Since God is dead, there is no God who gave Americans a chosen land. The special place of America, then, is within a violent capitalist economic system and not within a divine plan, § Marked 14:03 § and a communist theology addresses the inadequacy of such a capitalist religious world-view by redirecting our attention away from greed and individuality toward responsibility for others, especially abject others. It is time to take Žižek’s theological position and his description of Christianity seriously and to use it as a tool to help undermine America’s god, Capitalism.